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Clandestine Schemes:  
Burney’s Cecilia and the Marriage Act
Melissa J. Ganz
Marquette University
In Book VII of Cecilia, or Memoirs of an Heiress (1782), Frances Burney’s hero-
ine receives an unexpected visit from her admirer, Mortimer Delvile. Mortimer 
rushes from Bath to Suffolk in order to speak to Miss Beverley one last time 
before going abroad. He plans to leave England because of a “cruel clause” in 
her uncle’s will, making her inheritance conditional upon her husband’s adop-
tion of her surname.1 Mortimer knows that his proud parents will never permit 
him to marry her and give up the family’s ancient moniker; hence, he prepares 
to flee her society in a desperate effort to repress his love for her. When he 
overhears her expressing concern and affection for him, though, he forms a 
new plan. The next morning, when she receives him again, Mortimer nervously 
tells her that “all his hopes of being ever united to her, [rest] upon obtaining her 
consent to an immediate and secret marriage” (555). It proves difficult for him 
to gain her assent to such a union, however. Although her twenty-first birthday 
is just three days away and Mortimer is already of age, his parents’ approval, in 
her mind, is crucial to the match.
In the heated discussions that ensue, Burney reprises many of the arguments 
concerning clandestine unions that appeared in speeches, essays, and treatises 
leading up to and following the passage of Hardwicke’s 1753 Marriage Act. 
Revising the canon law’s approach to marriage, the Act required couples to 
solemnize their unions in formal, public ceremonies and required minors to 
obtain their fathers’ assent before they could receive licenses to wed. The law 
deemed invalid all unions that failed to comply with these rules.2 Not every-
one approved of the Act’s stringent requirements. While M.P.s like Edmund 
Burke and Richard Brinsley Sheridan supported the measure, those like Henry 
Fox and Charles Townshend vociferously opposed it.3 In their view, the law 
wrongly privileged social and familial stability over individual freedom and 
desire, while undermining women’s agency. Fox and other critics attempted 
to repeal or modify the Act on numerous occasions, nearly succeeding in 1765 
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and 1781.4 Clerics, jurists, and moralists meanwhile expressed concerns about 
the law in a stream of books and pamphlets.5 Published in the midst of— and 
shaped by— these controversies, Cecilia enters into important debates about the 
contractual nature of the nuptial tie.
Most critics read the novel as endorsing the conception of marriage inscribed 
in Hardwicke’s Act. Linking Burney’s anxieties about conjugal relations to her 
concerns about commercial culture, Miranda J. Burgess contends that Burney 
criticizes the free circulation of women much as she opposes the free circulation 
of capital.6 In Burgess’s view, Burney “conceives her ideal society . . . as a return 
to a world in which . . . marriage is a private agreement between a woman’s 
father and the suitor he approves.”7 “This is the world,” she claims, “of Hard-
wicke’s Marriage Act, respected and rigorously enforced.”8 James Thompson 
likewise suggests that the novel imagines marriage as an exchange between 
men. In his view, Burney imagines “only males . . . as owning subjects”; Ce-
cilia functions “as a conduit through which property is passed— through but 
not to her.”9 For Cynthia Klekar, too, the novel shows the failure of Cecilia’s 
independent agency and the necessity of her position as a “dependent wife.”10 
Although Terry Castle acknowledges Burney’s ambivalence about women’s 
subjugation, she insists that Burney’s “ideological retreat from her initial vision 
of female authority . . . is total— and mortifying.”11 In Castle’s reading, Cecilia’s 
“mock death [is] indistinguishable from her marriage,” as Burney finally re-
veals herself to be an “apologist for the ancien régime.”12
Burney’s portrait of conjugal relations, however, is more complicated than 
these critics suggest. In this essay, I read the novel’s nuptial negotiations in 
the context of the debates surrounding Hardwicke’s Act, showing how Cecilia 
responds to and participates in one of the most divisive public controversies 
of the Enlightenment. In doing so, I challenge the view of Burney as a con-
servative defender of patriarchal culture, while highlighting the balances that 
she strikes between individual freedom and filial duty.13 Although the novel 
reveals the problems that result when parents and guardians arrange matches 
for children without consulting their wishes, I will argue, it also shows the 
need to restrict children’s nuptial freedom. Through the lengthy and agoniz-
ing negotiations that Cecilia engages in with Mortimer and his mother, as well 
as the difficulties that she experiences when she and Mortimer attempt to ex-
change secret vows, the novel demonstrates the ethical and practical problems 
that result from private matches. Such unions not only challenge the legitimate 
authority of parents and guardians, the novel shows, but also enable men to un-
dermine women’s consent. Burney is keenly aware that parents and guardians 
sometimes abuse their authority, but she ultimately affords them considerable 
control over marriage: Cecilia suggests that all couples— even those over the 
age of majority— ought to obtain the approval of parents or guardians before 
they wed.
While the novel imaginatively extends the reach of the Act, however, it offers 
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a subtle critique of the patriarchal principle that underwrites this law. In Cecilia, 
Burney shows the dangers of turning marriage into an exchange between men. 
Shifting the locus of authority from Cecilia’s guardian and prospective father-
in-law to her prospective mother-in-law, Burney highlights the importance of 
maternal as well as paternal consent. She also affirms Cecilia’s own agency in 
the negotiation of her union with Mortimer and even hints at Cecilia’s auton-
omy as a wife. In the bequest that Mrs. Delvile’s sister leaves Cecilia when she 
dies and the change that Mortimer undergoes after Cecilia’s illness, the novel 
offers a model of marriage as an affective agreement between two equal agents. 
“THE LIBERTY OF MARRYING WITHOUT ANY RESTRAINT”: 
HARDWICKE’S ACT AND THE CLANDESTINE MARRIAGE 
DEBATES
Before turning to Cecilia, we need to consider the debates about marriage that 
swirled through England in the years leading up to the novel’s publication. 
Until the middle of the century, it was easy— in theory— for couples to marry: 
parties simply had to exchange vows in the present tense. According to canon 
law, such contracts nullified all subsequent unions— even those formalized in 
church.14 In practice, the church courts required strong evidence before they 
recognized unsolemnized vows, and the canons of 1604 threatened couples 
with punishment if they failed to comply with certain formalities, such as pub-
lishing banns or purchasing a license and exchanging vows in a church be-
fore witnesses during canonical hours.15 Ministers who solemnized matches in 
violation of these rules could be suspended for three years; individuals who 
participated in or witnessed such ceremonies could be censured or even ex-
communicated. The church courts rarely enforced these penalties, however, 
and the unions, if properly witnessed, remained valid.16 Couples thus routinely 
married in irregular— often clandestine— ways in taverns, prisons, and even 
brothels, prompting sharp criticism from clerics, jurists, and other observers 
throughout the Restoration and early eighteenth century.17 
Critics objected to secret unions for a number of reasons, including their ten-
dency to promote coercion and fraud. “Besides the Dissatisfaction of Mind, and 
the very early Repentance of the Parties themselves,” Henry Gally observed in 
Some Considerations Upon Clandestine Marriages (1750), “. . . such Marriages are 
liable to many bad Consequences of a public Nature, which disturb the Peace 
and good Order of Society.”18 In particular, he explained:
By this Means Women may be married against their Will; and so lose the Property 
of their own Persons: which is the most valuable of all Properties. . . . [I]t cannot be 
said . . . that no Woman can be forced to give her Consent, and repeat her Part of 
the Marriage Office: both of which are essential to the Validity of a Marriage. For 
Men, who are wicked enough to attempt to marry Women against their Will, will 
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always be ready and able to procure Witnesses to swear that the Woman gave her 
Consent, and repeated her Part of the Office.19
Gally here extends John Locke’s account of self-ownership to women, while 
highlighting the ways in which secret unions threaten female agency.20 Else-
where in Some Considerations, he criticized women for themselves engaging in 
fraud, citing a series of cases in which savvy females exchanged vows with men 
whom they knew to be married in order to “skreen [sic] themselves from their 
Creditors.”21 “When clandestine Marriages are so practic’d, and so tolerated,” 
he complained, “what Security can Persons, who act bona fide, have of their 
being legally married?”22 Judges expressed similar concerns about the unreli-
ability of evidence submitted in cases involving secret unions and the ability 
of individuals to overturn long-standing, publicly solemnized matches with 
claims of prior contracts.23
Legislators, for their part, repeatedly introduced bills seeking to ban such 
matches. It took until 1753, however, for both Houses of Parliament to agree 
on the goals and terms of a law.24 In the spring of that year, Lord Chancellor 
Hardwicke introduced a bill that combined a host of restrictions with severe 
penalties for non-compliance.25 In its final form, the bill provided that all unions 
solemnized in England and Wales would be void unless they were preceded 
either by the calling of banns on three prior Sundays in the parish churches 
where the parties lived, or by the issue of an ecclesiastical license. Marriages 
had to be solemnized by an authorized clergyman according to the form es-
tablished in the Book of Common Prayer, and they had to take place in church in 
the presence of at least two witnesses. They also had to be properly registered. 
Any clergyman who knowingly and willfully solemnized a union in violation 
of these rules was deemed a felon and subject to transportation for fourteen 
years.26 Most important for our purposes, individuals under the age of twenty-
one needed to obtain the consent of their fathers in order to proceed according 
to license. If a minor’s father was no longer living, she needed to obtain the 
assent of her guardian or— if she had no guardian— that of her mother. Without 
such permission, her union would be void.27 Although minors could appeal to 
the Lord Chancellor if they felt that their guardians and mothers had unreason-
ably withheld their consent, minors could not contest their father’s decisions.28 
The measure explicitly privileged the interests of fathers over those of wives 
and children.
The bill’s provisions sparked considerable debate in the House of Com-
mons. In addition to raising moral and legal objections, legislators criticized 
the measure on practical grounds. M.P.s like Fox and William Beckford com-
plained that the restrictions would create only more opportunities for men 
to deceive women because they could knowingly leave some formalities un-
finished. In Fox’s view, the bill would “expose the whole female sex to their 
most infamous betrayers.”29 Beckford similarly quipped that the measure was 
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more appropriately entitled “a Bill for the ruin of the fair sex.”30 Opponents also 
expressed concerns about the proposed increase in paternal authority. Town-
shend warned that the bill would establish “such a tyrannical power in the 
father, as [would] . . . be the ruin of many children.”31 Robert Nugent likewise 
complained that “whilst the father is alive, even the court of Chancery is to 
have no power to authorize a proper marriage without his consent, let his re-
fusal be never so whimsical or selfish.”32 Some legislators further objected that 
the bill would prevent the circulation of wealth in society by securing all of the 
rich heiresses for wealthy men.33 
Supporters of the bill, though, countered that the restrictions were necessary 
to prevent “the ruin of young persons and the distress of families.”34 The Solici-
tor General, William Murray— soon to be Chief Justice Mansfield— maintained 
that the confusion occasioned by the canon law’s lax rules endangered women.35 
In his view, the proposed increase in parental authority was both necessary and 
reasonable. There was no country in the world, he reminded his colleagues, 
in which parents had as little power over their children as they had in Eng-
land.36 John Bond, Earl of Hillsborough, likewise noted that in Holland, sons 
under twenty-five and daughters under twenty could not marry without their 
fathers’ consent, and even children above these ages had to give express notice 
to their parents of their intended unions, which their parents might forbid.37 
These arguments in favor of parental control ultimately prevailed. On June 6, 
after nearly three months of heated debates, Parliament passed the “Act for the 
Better Preventing of Clandestine Marriages”— or, Hardwicke’s Marriage Act, 
as it came to be known. As of March 25, 1754, all couples who wished to solem-
nize vows in England and Wales had to comply with the restrictions set forth 
in the new law.38 
Historians disagree about the meaning and implications of the Act, but at 
the time observers felt that the law would produce great changes in conjugal 
life.39 A flurry of pamphlets and treatises appeared in print immediately after 
its passage. The anonymous author of A Letter to the Public (1753) endorsed the 
measure, explaining in good Lockean fashion that “Infants or Minors, may and 
ought to be restrained, as wanting the Degree of Judgment necessary to discern 
the Consequences of their Actions” and that it was “absurd . . . to constitute 
[them] absolute Judges for themselves in Matrimony, the most important of all 
Contracts.”40 In An Enquiry into the Force and Operation of the Annulling Clauses in 
a Late Act . . . With Respect to Conscience (1754), however, Henry Stebbing— an or-
thodox minister of the Church of England and the Act’s most vocal opponent— 
objected that the law infringed upon men’s natural rights. “[N]o Man,” he 
insisted, “by entering into Society, can or ought to be presumed to have yielded 
up into the Hands of the Society, his natural Right to contract Marriage, as shall 
seem to him most expedient for the Security of his Virtue.”41 As Stebbing saw it, 
no human law could dissolve a union made in pursuance of this right. “[T]he 
legal Form of contracting Marriage hath nothing to do with the Essence of the 
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Contract as it lies before God,” he declared.42 In his view, “[t]he present Act . . . 
hath not altered nor can any Law alter the Nature of the Contract as it concerns 
Conscience, which, the Right of contracting supposed, is full and compleat [sic] 
in the mutual Stipulation of the Parties as known to God.”43
Stebbing expressed particular concerns about the Act’s nullity provision 
as it concerned minors, explaining that he had long felt the canon law to be 
too harsh in requiring children under twenty-one to obtain parental approval 
before they could wed. In his view, parents’ decisions were “sometimes cruel 
and unnatural.”44 While minors ought to consult their parents’ wishes before 
exchanging vows, he felt, they ought to retain the “decisive Voice as having the 
principal Interest.”45 Stebbing returned to this question in A Dissertation on the 
Power of States to Deny Civil Protection to the Marriages of Minors (1755). In that 
work, he conceded the practical necessity of requiring couples to solemnize 
their vows in public ceremonies.46 But he insisted on the distinction between 
the form of marriage and its essence, maintaining that, while legislators might 
deem minors’ unions to be without any “civil Effects,” they could not nullify 
these contracts as they concerned conscience.47 
Critics continued to express these and other concerns about the Act in the 
decades following its passage. In 1764, for example, the anonymous author of 
Reflections on the Marriage Act; with Some Hints for a New Law wondered “how this 
bill, fraught with inconveniencies, loaded with restraints upon marriage, made 
its way through both houses of parliament, and has, near ten years now, been re-
ceived as a law among a wise, a brave, and a free people.”48 Like Stebbing, he felt 
that marriage was “nothing more than a simple contract between two persons, 
to live together during life, as husband and wife.”49 For practical reasons, he felt 
that the existence of a marriage ought not to be kept secret. Thus, he endorsed the 
provision requiring couples to record their marriages in registers, and he insisted 
that the legislature ought to compel wives to bear their husbands’ names.50 Yet, 
in all other respects, he denounced the law, expressing admiration for his “fellow 
subjects in Scotland . . . [who] enjoyed the peculiar liberty of marrying without 
any restraint.”51 In Reflections on the Repeal of the Marriage-Act (1765), another critic 
similarly held up Scotland as a model, maintaining that his own country’s law 
wrongly circumscribed “the natural rights and freedom of mankind.”52
In Parliament, meanwhile, Fox and other Whigs repeatedly sought to repeal 
or, at least, modify the Act. Their efforts met with resistance, though, from M.P.s 
like Burke and Sheridan. The question under consideration, Burke explained 
in his speech against Fox’s 1781 repeal bill, was “whether the minors of both 
sexes, without the consent of their parents, ought to have a capacity of contract-
ing the matrimonial, whilst they have not the capacity of contracting any other 
engagement.”53 He insisted that they should not:
The improvident marriage of one man becomes a tax upon the orderly and regular 
marriage of all the rest. Therefore those laws are wisely constituted, that give a 
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man the use of all his faculties at one time; that they may be mutually subservi-
ent, aiding and assisting to each other. . . . To give a man a family during his ap-
prenticeship, whilst his very labor belongs to another; to give him a family when 
you do not give him a fortune to maintain it; to give him a family before he can 
contract any one of those engagements, without which no business can be carried 
on, would be to burden the state with families without any security for their main-
tenance. When parents themselves marry their children, they become in some 
sort security to prevent the ill consequences. You have this security in parental 
consent.54
Unlike Stebbing, Burke privileged positive law over natural law, the “legal 
form” of marriage over its “essence.” Where Stebbing sought to protect indi-
vidual rights and liberties, Burke worried about the larger social and economic 
implications of secret matches. Stability and order in society, rather than the 
love of prospective spouses, were Burke’s chief concern. His focus on parental 
consent effectively erased that of the contracting parties, but he saw no rea-
son to be alarmed. In his view, critics like Fox needlessly worried about the 
“avaricious principle of fathers.”55 “It is avarice by proxy,” Burke maintained; 
“it is avarice not working by itself or for itself, but through the medium of 
parental affection, meaning to procure good to its offspring.”56 He conceded 
that “parents in high rank will generally aim at, and will sometimes have the 
means, too, of preserving their minor children from any but wealthy or splen-
did matches.”57 “But,” he insisted, “this authority preserves [them] from a 
thousand misfortunes, which embitter every part of every man’s domestic life, 
and tear to pieces the dearest ties in society.”58 Burke’s arguments in favor of 
parental control ultimately prevailed: although the Commons voted to amend 
the Act, the Lords defeated Fox’s measure.59 The law would, in fact, remain un-
changed until 1822.60 But the debates would continue both inside and outside 
Parliament.
SECRET PLEDGES AND COERCED VOWS:  
NUPTIAL NEGOTIATIONS IN CECILIA
Burney was not yet two years old when Hardwicke’s Act took effect in March 
of 1754, but over the course of the next two decades, she gained a keen un-
derstanding of the issues it raised about parental authority, conjugal freedom, 
and contractual agency. During this period, Burney seems to have become at 
least partly sympathetic to the plight of young couples who wished to marry 
in defiance of their parents’ wishes. Her journal entries and letters of the late 
1760s through early ’80s contain many allusions to David Garrick and George 
Colman’s popular comedy, The Clandestine Marriage (1766), which offered a 
light-hearted but pointed critique of the law in its portrait of Fanny Sterling’s 
illicit union with her father’s poor apprentice.61 Burney seems to have been par-
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ticularly struck by the character of Lord Ogleby, the elderly suitor who initially 
seeks to marry Fanny but later convinces her outraged father to forgive her and 
to sanction her secret match. In her letters, Burney expressed admiration for 
Ogleby, invoking his words and sentiments on at least four occasions.62 
Burney did not have to turn to the theater, though, to discern the difficul-
ties that the Act created for young couples. Disputes about secret unions raged 
in her own family. In May of 1772, Burney’s step-sister Maria Allen secretly 
married Martin Folkes Rishton in France, against the wishes of their parents; 
later that year, her seventeen-year-old step-brother, Stephen Allen, eloped to 
Gretna Green with the daughter of a Norfolk physician; and in 1777, Elizabeth 
(“Bessy”) Allen followed her siblings’ lead, secretly exchanging vows at Ypres 
with an adventurer whom she met in Paris.63 Although the elopements caused 
great consternation among the Burneys and their friends, Frances seems to have 
reacted with both surprise and excitement when she learned of Maria’s mar-
riage. “How strange— how wonderful an affair!” Burney observed in her jour-
nal three days after her step-sister’s return.64 Burney feared that their mother 
would be furious when she learned of the union, but she felt that Maria’s age 
might lessen the blow, as Maria was just two months shy of twenty-one. “Cer-
tain it is, that she will so soon be of age, &, consequently, wholly independent,” 
Burney reasoned, “that opposition would be very fruitless even supposing 
she was [still] unmarried, which Mama doubtless does suppose.”65 Mrs. Bur-
ney did not view the matter in the same light. While Charles Burney seems to 
have immediately accepted Maria’s union, his wife resented her daughter for 
“flaunting her authority and embarrassing her by [the] elopement.”66 Bessy’s 
match proved even more scandalous than Maria’s. According to one of Mrs. 
Burney’s friends, Bessy’s spouse was “a Bankrupt in fame as well as Fortune.”67 
Bessy’s blatant infidelity suggests that she came to realize her mistake.68 
As Burney destroyed nearly all of the journal entries that she made during 
the days and months following her siblings’ elopements, we have few records 
of her initial reactions to these matches.69 But in her fiction she returns again 
and again to the moral, legal, and practical questions that the unions raise, 
showing particular concerns about the ways in which they affect women. All 
of her novels consider the implications of secret vows: Evelina (1778) and The 
Wanderer (1814) depict heroines who are haunted by their parents’ clandestine 
actions, unable to claim their rightful names because their fathers refuse pub-
licly to recognize them, and Camilla (1796) recounts the loss of agency that the 
naïve heiress Eugenia Tyrold experiences after an adventurer forcibly carries 
her to Gretna Green and marries her there against her will.70 But none of Bur-
ney’s texts devotes as much attention to the value and limits of secret unions as 
does Cecilia. In this novel, Burney subtly probes the controversies that swirled 
around the Act, revealing the dangers of both excess restraint and excess free-
dom in the formation of marriage. 
The problems stemming from parental control become clear early on in the 
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text. Through Cecilia’s struggles to assert agency in her relationships with men, 
the novel offers a telling rebuke to Marriage Act proponents like Burke. A close 
friend of Dr. Burney, Burke was also a devotee of Frances’s fiction; he reportedly 
stayed up all night reading Evelina and, after finishing Cecilia, he sent Burney 
a letter thanking her “for the very great instruction & entertainment [he] ha[d] 
received from the new present [she had] bestowed on the publick [sic].”71 Burney, 
in turn, expressed great admiration for the eminent orator.72 Yet, in Cecilia, as in 
all of her novels, she offers a sharp critique of his views of marriage. Where Burke 
felt relief at the prospect of “parents . . . marry[ing] their children,” Burney shows 
the problems that result when fathers and guardians attempt to wed children 
and wards against the latter’s own wishes.73 Two of Cecilia’s guardians— the ex-
travagant Mr. Harrel and the miserly Mr. Briggs— attempt to negotiate unions on 
her behalf. To support his lavish lifestyle and gambling addiction, Mr. Harrel not 
only coerces Cecilia into lending him large sums of money, but also attempts to 
wed her to Sir Robert Floyer, one of his odious creditors. (Sir Robert agrees to can-
cel Harrel’s debt if “the prize [that Harrel] expect[s] in his ward should fall to his 
share” [433].) Although Cecilia rejects Sir Robert’s proposal, Mr. Harrel refuses to 
accept that her “no” means “no.” He encourages Sir Robert anew and, in an at-
tempt to dissuade other suitors from approaching her, tells everyone that they are 
already engaged. In a society where gossip and falsehood pass easily for truth, 
his strategy nearly succeeds: Mortimer initially believes that Cecilia is betrothed. 
“[H]ow was I to discredit what was not uttered as a conjecture, but asserted as a 
fact? asserted, too, by the guardian with whom you lived?” (309), Mortimer ex-
plains when she informs him of his mistake. Although Cecilia rebukes Mr. Har-
rel for his “wilful misapprehension” (368) of her refusal and eventually makes 
Sir Robert see the futility of his suit, her guardian’s negotiations cause her to be 
subjected to repeated and unwanted advances. In his desperate dealings with his 
creditors, as in the threats that he uses to obtain money from his ward, the novel 
shows, Mr. Harrel abuses his authority and undermines Cecilia’s agency.
Cecilia’s parsimonious guardian, Mr. Briggs, similarly disregards her will. 
Where Mr. Harrel coerces her into borrowing large sums from a usurer so that 
she can help him pay his debts, Mr. Briggs reminds her of the restriction pre-
venting her from forming binding contracts. “Are but a minor, can’t be made 
pay a farthing” (181), he declares when he learns of her obligation to a book-
seller. After she asks him for some of the money that he holds on her behalf, he 
refuses, curtly explaining, “[k]eep it for your husband; get you one soon. . . . 
Don’t be in a hurry; one in my eye” (180). In his view, Cecilia’s minority pre-
vents her from acting as an agent in nuptial affairs as in economic agreements; 
although her consent is technically required for her to form a valid union, he 
ignores her wishes, assuming sole responsibility for arranging the match. The 
miserly Mr. Briggs could hardly be more different from the extravagant Mr. 
Harrel, but the two prove similar in a crucial way: like her irresponsible guard-
ian, Mr. Briggs thinks of the nuptial tie as an agreement between men. 
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Cecilia’s paternal uncle, Dean Beverley, likewise shares this view of mar-
riage, reining in her conjugal freedom from beyond the grave. When he dies, he 
makes her “heiress to an estate of 3000l. per annum; with no other restriction 
than that of annexing her name, if she marrie[s], to the disposal of her hand 
and her riches” (5–6). Although this provision subverts the central symbolic 
act of coverture— the veiling of a wife’s identity behind her husband’s name— it 
constricts rather than enhances Cecilia’s liberty.74 Cecilia is unable to marry 
Mortimer because his haughty father, Compton— who serves as her third 
guardian— considers “the name of his ancestors [to be] inseparably annexed” 
to the “honour of his house” (561). Delvile’s wife, Augusta, who is descended 
from a branch of the same family, shares her husband’s pride in their heritage. 
She makes it clear to Cecilia that she and Compton will never permit Mor-
timer to relinquish that most visible marker of their “ancient and honourable 
house” (936). (They have, in fact, long been planning a “splendid connection” 
[564] between Mortimer and one of his cousins.) The lengthy sequence at the 
Delviles’ dreary castle, recounting Cecilia’s and Mortimer’s growing attrac-
tion toward— yet curious estrangement from— each other, shows the problems 
that result from the Dean’s and the Delviles’ conflicting obsession with lineage. 
Mortimer acknowledges his feelings for Cecilia when he rushes outside to save 
her from a lightning storm, declaring her life to be “more precious . . . than the 
air [he] breathe[s]!” (473). Yet he appears troubled and distracted, expressing 
frustration that further intimacy between them is “utterly impossible” (475). 
Burney evokes Cecilia’s own confusion and anxiety during this period by wait-
ing until the very end of the sequence before revealing the cause of Mortimer’s 
aloof behavior. Mortimer, we learn, has long known of the provision in Mr. 
Beverley’s will and realizes that a match with Cecilia is out of the question. 
Through the barbed comments of Compton’s outspoken cousin, Lady Honoria 
Pemberton— who declares Mortimer to be a “puppet” (515) of his parents— the 
novel undermines his decision to obey the Delviles’ wishes. But the struggle 
that Mortimer undergoes in attempting to repress his love for Cecilia is its own 
punishment: he suffers from both mental anguish and a related physical ill-
ness. In the Dean and the Delviles— as in Mr. Harrel and Mr. Briggs— Burney 
undermines Burke’s faith in the “benevolent avarice” of parents and guardians, 
highlighting the problems that result when children lack the “decisive voice” in 
the matter of marriage.75
Through Mortimer’s proposal that he and Cecilia exchange secret vows, the 
novel examines a different conception of marriage as an affective agreement 
between two free individuals. Mortimer, as we have seen, prepares to leave 
England in an attempt to flee Cecilia and improve his health. But when he over-
hears her confess her love for him, he changes his mind. Unlike her guardians, 
Mortimer now affirms Cecilia’s right to negotiate her own tie. Specifically, he 
proposes that they exchange vows in a secret— but lawful— ceremony after she 
turns twenty-one. (Burney here considers the obverse of her step-sister’s plight; 
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where Maria exchanged secret vows with her suitor shortly before reaching the 
age of majority, Mortimer proposes that Cecilia do so right after she attains it.) 
Mortimer further offers to have his friend John Belfield— a disaffected lawyer 
who is an open critic of “customs” (15) and “established forms” (16)— draw up 
a bond settling Cecilia’s fortune and his own expected inheritance. The pro-
posal signals Mortimer’s rejection of his parents’ authority and his willingness 
to form an equal union. As Susan Staves explains, a marriage settlement “had 
at least two parties to it, usually more, not only the bride and groom but also 
both fathers and often other relatives and trustees.”76 Rather than involve his 
haughty father in this contract, Mortimer declares his desire to settle their prop-
erty “according to the arbitration of [their] mutual friends” (565). In embracing 
the pre-Hardwicke view of marriage as a consensual, affective tie between two 
free agents, Mortimer appears to shore up Cecilia’s will. 
The novel, though, questions the wisdom of Mortimer’s scheme. Right be-
fore he goes to Mrs. Charlton’s house to take leave of Cecilia, the latter receives 
a visit from Lady Honoria. As she hurries away, Lady Honoria “protest[s] [that] 
she ha[s] already outstayed her father’s patience, and . . . [that] the delay of an-
other minute [will] occasion half a dozen expresses to know whether she [has] 
gone towards Scotland or Flanders” (544–45). By placing these glib remarks 
about clandestine marriage immediately before Mortimer’s proposal, Burney 
suggests a connection between the technically-legal-but-secret union that Mor-
timer contemplates and the illicit matches to which Lady Honoria alludes. In-
deed, Cecilia reacts to Mortimer’s plan as if he had suggested that they run off 
to Gretna Green. To her, the proposal is “humiliating” (560); she recoils from 
the idea of forcing herself upon a family that disdains her name. In addition to 
the emotional costs of such a union, Cecilia worries about its practical ramifica-
tions. “The example of your friends might work powerfully upon yourself,” 
she tells Mortimer, “and who shall dare assure me you would not catch the in-
fection?” (557). After all, she reminds him, “Have you not this moment avowed 
that but yesterday you held in abhorrence the very plan that to-day you pro-
pose?” (557). The idea of a clandestine match also offends the “strictness of her 
principles” (560); her “delicacy . . . revolt[s] against a conduct of which the se-
crecy seem[s] to imply the impropriety” (566). Although Mortimer insists that 
they would not violate any moral precepts by marrying secretly, Cecilia feels 
that “duty [would] be offended” by their union, since it is “contrary to the will 
of [his] parents” (572). Mortimer’s appeals to his own independence and her 
imminent emancipation fall on deaf ears. In Cecilia’s view, these considerations 
do not “set [them] free from [their] duty” (572). Only after Mortimer impresses 
upon her that “no law, human or divine, can be injured by [their] union” (572), 
and that the single obstacle to their happiness is his parents’ pride, does she 
give her consent. She does so, however, “[f]earfully . . . and with unfeigned re-
luctance” (574). Almost immediately after Mortimer leaves her, Cecilia regrets 
having agreed to commit an “undutiful” and “clandestine” act (576). It makes 
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no difference to her that they have agreed to marry in church with a license in 
the presence of two witnesses, two days after she will have come of age. Al-
though their union will not violate the terms of Hardwicke’s Act, the law, in her 
view, does not alone define the boundaries of permissible behavior. 
The novel shows that these concerns are well founded. Through the difficul-
ties that Cecilia experiences leading up to and during the ceremony, Burney 
imaginatively extends the reach of the Act: where Stebbing celebrated minors’ 
contractual capacities, Burney suggests that even children over the age of ma-
jority ought to obtain the approval of parents and guardians before they wed. 
This idea received support from some legislators and jurists in the world out-
side the novel. During the debates in the Commons, as we have seen, propo-
nents of Hardwicke’s bill approvingly pointed to the more stringent rules that 
obtained in countries like Holland.77 Cecilia’s plight shows that an increase in 
authority is necessary for both practical and ethical reasons. Shortly after Ce-
cilia agrees to the match, she writes Mortimer a letter retracting her consent. 
When her trusted friend Mr. Monckton fails to place the epistle in Mortimer’s 
hands, she sets out for London with Mrs. Charlton, determined to break off the 
nuptials rather than go through with an unsanctioned ceremony. In this lengthy 
sequence, however, nothing proceeds as planned. Shortly after Cecilia departs, 
she gets detained by a group of gossips whom she met while in company with 
the Harrels. When the inquisitive Mr. Gosport asks her what takes her to Lon-
don, she evasively replies that she has “some business” (597) there, raising his 
suspicion. She likewise dodges his questions concerning Mortimer’s where-
abouts and the last time that she has seen him. But her “own equivocation . . . 
[is] glaringly exposed” (601) when Mr. Gosport reminds her of Mortimer’s re-
cent visit to Mrs. Charlton’s house, of which he has heard from Mr. Monckton’s 
ever watchful wife. Shortly thereafter, when Mortimer comes looking for her on 
horseback, all “muffled up” (602) in disguise, he arouses only more suspicion. 
At least one member of the party, Mr. Morrice, suspects the real identity of this 
“gentleman spy” (615). In a world filled with prying eyes and an endless craving 
for “intelligence” (466), the novel shows, it is difficult to keep a matter like this 
one a secret.78 Still, Cecilia persists in her attempt to break off the engagement. 
When Mortimer comes to her lodgings in London that night, she confusingly 
explains, “I have made a promise too rash to be kept; . . . you must pardon me if, 
late as it is, I retract, since I am convinced it was wrong, and must be wretched 
in performing it” (617). Mortimer agrees to release her, for he does not wish 
“to fetter [or] to compel [her]” (618). But after he tells her that Mr. Morrice has 
seen him come up to her chamber, she agrees to go through with the wedding. 
It would look worse, in the eyes of society, she feels, if she does not marry Mor-
timer at this point. Her final assent to the union is thus coerced, driven more by 
a desire to maintain her reputation than by a willingness to sanctify her love for 
Mortimer and defy the Delviles’ wishes. 
The ceremony itself further threatens Cecilia’s agency. After the long, drawn-
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out discussions leading up to the wedding and the troubles that delay Cecilia 
on her journey to London, Burney relates the events in the church exceedingly 
rapidly, evoking Cecilia’s sense of confusion and lack of control. Everything 
is “hastened with the utmost expedition” (624). Worried that she will again 
retract her consent, Mortimer rushes her out of the carriage and into the cha-
pel, leaving her no time to think. The frenzied proceeding comes to a sudden 
halt, though, when the priest inquires whether “any man can shew [sic] any just 
cause why they may not lawfully be joined together” (625) and an unknown woman 
hiding in the back of the pews calls out in the affirmative. The interruption ter-
rifies Cecilia; she views it as an “unaccountable prohibition” (633) and walks, 
in a daze, down the aisle and out of the church. We later learn that there is no 
legal basis for the objection and that the disruption is merely the work of an 
unscrupulous and desperate man: Cecilia’s false friend and would-be spouse, 
Mr. Monckton, has sent his servant to stop the proceedings. But Mortimer’s 
reaction to the interruption underscores his willingness to substitute coercion 
for consent. Certain that the woman’s interference is “wholly accidental” (626), 
Mortimer beseeches Cecilia to finish the ceremony. When she continues walk-
ing and motions to him not to follow, Mortimer becomes even more agitated. 
“You are mine, you are my wife!— I will part with you no more,” he declares, 
forcibly catching her hand as she attempts to step inside a carriage, “and go 
withersoever [sic] you will, I will follow and claim you!” (628). In rhetorically 
transforming his fiancée into his spouse, Mortimer suggests that Cecilia’s con-
sent to the contract is irrelevant. Even though Cecilia refuses to exchange vows 
with him, Mortimer asserts a proprietary interest in her. While he cannot legally 
enforce his claim, as he might have done before the passage of Hardwicke’s 
Act, he causes Cecilia considerable anguish. Mortimer’s behavior leading up 
to and during the ceremony shows the ways in which secret unions threaten to 
undermine women’s agency. Where Stebbing overlooks the possibility of co-
ercion in courtship, Burney highlights the disparities in power that permeate 
heterosexual relations and make secret matches potentially dangerous for all 
women.
Mr. Monckton’s role in the disruption further highlights the dangers of pri-
vate matches, while affirming the importance of filial duty. Married to a bitter 
old woman whom he despises, Mr. Monckton has “long looked upon [Ceci-
lia] as his future property” (9). When he first learns of Cecilia’s engagement, 
he attempts to frighten his friend into retracting her consent. The match “will 
lead you into a family of which every individual will disdain you,” he warns 
Cecilia. “[I]t will make you inmate of an [sic] house of which no other inmate 
will associate with you; you will be insulted as an inferior, and reproached as 
an intruder; your birth will be a subject of ridicule, and your whole race only 
named with derision” (582). Monckton’s strategy works: as we have seen, Ceci-
lia writes a letter to Mortimer explaining that she cannot go through with their 
plan. When Monckton fails to deliver this letter in time, though, he becomes 
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desperate. In sending Miss Bennet to disrupt the ceremony, he plays upon Ce-
cilia’s fears about defying the Delviles, aware that she is anxious about mar-
rying Mortimer without obtaining their assent. The secrecy surrounding the 
intrusion heightens Cecilia’s dread. Coming from the back of the chapel, Miss 
Bennet’s disembodied voice initially seems to be a sign of divine intervention. 
Monckton’s secrecy makes it difficult for Cecilia to discover his treachery. (“I 
know not what to suspect,” she complains to Mortimer, “where every thing 
is . . . involved in obscurity” [629].79) She becomes horrified when she later 
learns that her “oldest friend and confidant” (835) could “so unfeelingly . . . dis-
solve [her] union at the very altar” (835). While the novel criticizes Monckton 
for intruding upon Cecilia’s relationship with his rival, the mysterious interdic-
tion serves as a reminder that Cecilia does not have the approval of Mortimer’s 
parents and that there is thus, a moral— albeit not a legal— impediment to the 
union. 
The lengthy and agonizing negotiations in which Cecilia, Mortimer, and Mrs. 
Delvile subsequently engage further suggest that Cecilia is right to be anxious 
about exchanging vows with Mortimer in defiance of his parents’ wishes. The 
“conflict scene”— “the very scene,” Burney explained, “for which [she] wrote 
the whole book”80— makes clear the toll that the dispute takes on all parties. 
The discussions begin three days after Cecilia returns from London, when Mrs. 
Delvile pays her a visit. (Despite their best efforts at secrecy, Mortimer’s mother 
immediately learns of the scene that takes place inside the church.) Mrs. Delvile 
comes to Cecilia “in the name of Mr. Delvile, and in the name of [their] whole 
family” (638). As a representative of this “ancient” and “honourable” clan (936), 
she explains that they do not object to Cecilia’s character, family, or fortune, but 
they cannot permit their son— “the last survivor of his house” (640)— to relin-
quish his august patronym. Distressed and humiliated by this condescending 
avowal from a woman she reveres and loves, Cecilia agrees to end her relation-
ship with Mortimer. When Mrs. Delvile brings her son to say farewell to Cecilia, 
however, he surprises them all by declaring that he “come[s] not to release, but 
to claim her” (671), initiating the longest and most excruciating of the novel’s 
negotiations. After Mrs. Delvile taunts her son with the idea of assuming the 
name of “Mr. Beverley” and paints a picture of the “blood of [his] wronged 
ancestors ris[ing] into [his] guilty cheeks” (677), he yields to her will— only to 
“retract and forswear” his “rash declaration” (679) yet again when he sees the 
misery written on Cecilia’s face. Through these sudden changes of heart, the 
novel affirms Cecilia’s earlier fears, revealing Mortimer’s susceptibility to his 
parents’ manipulation as well as his own investment in his family’s honor. 
The pressure that Mrs. Delvile puts on Cecilia throughout this scene like-
wise suggests the necessity of obeying her wishes, even as the anguish that 
Cecilia suffers and the attack of illness that Mrs. Delvile herself experiences 
undermine the latter’s coercion. In a last, desperate effort to prevent a union 
between her son and Cecilia, Mrs. Delvile resorts to emotional blackmail, 
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threatening to withhold her love from them if they continue to disobey her. The 
strategy fails: Mortimer “cast[s] off in desperation all timidity and restraint” 
and, catching Cecilia’s hand from his mother, declares that he “cannot [and] . . . 
will not give her up!” (680). Overwhelmed by this turn of events, Mrs. Delvile 
rushes out of the room, exclaiming that her “brain is on fire!” (680); she then 
collapses on the floor. Ironically, now that the confrontation becomes too much 
for her to bear, she regains control of it. When Cecilia sees Mrs. Delvile lying 
there, her mouth filled and her face covered with blood, she directs Mortimer 
to resign himself entirely to his mother’s will and “solemnly . . . promise[s]” on 
both of their behalves that they will “separate for ever” (682). In this climactic 
conclusion to their agonizing negotiations, Mrs. Delvile replicates Mr. Harrel’s 
coercive tactics. Now, as before, Burney suggests the illegitimacy of such ploys. 
By transforming the metaphorical blood of Mrs. Delvile’s ancestors into the 
literal blood of her brain hemorrhage, Burney undermines Augusta’s invest-
ment in the family pride, while showing the way that blackmail recoils upon 
those who use it.81 But Mrs. Delvile’s collapse puts an end to the dispute: Mor-
timer now agrees to submit to his parents’ wishes and, after asking Cecilia’s 
forgiveness, leaves the house. Burney can neither imagine nor countenance his 
refusal at this point. Even as the novel punishes Mrs. Delvile for coercing Ceci-
lia and Mortimer’s compliance, it shows the necessity of yielding to her wishes. 
Through this emotionally charged scene, the novel insists upon the importance 
of filial obedience, even as it reveals the costs of such deference. 
REIMAGINING MARRIAGE
Although Cecilia endorses— and, indeed, extends— the restrictions that Hard-
wicke’s Act places on children’s matches, it offers a powerful critique of the 
patriarchal principle that underwrites this law. The Act, we remember, required 
minors to obtain the consent of their fathers before they could obtain licenses 
to wed. If a minor’s father was no longer living, she needed to obtain the ap-
proval of her guardian; only if she had no guardian could she seek her mother’s 
assent.82 The law permitted the Lord Chancellor to substitute his own decision 
for the wishes of guardians and mothers if the latter were absent overseas or 
mentally incompetent, or if they acted unreasonably in withholding their con-
sent, but it did not include a similar provision for fathers; they had the final say 
in the matter.83 While some observers were convinced that fathers would never 
abuse their power, others were troubled by the distinction that the law made 
on this point. “It is remarkable . . . and surely a capital defect in the act,” the au-
thor of Reflections on the Marriage Act complained, “that though there is a clause 
providing for the case of a mother’s being non compos mentis, and her, or the 
guardians’ improperly with-holding their consent to the marriage of the minor; 
yet there is no provision, if the like should happen from a father’s lunacy, or his 
unreasonableness.”84 The canons that regulated marriage before 1754 did not 
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specifically privilege paternal over maternal authority. (The relevant provision 
required minors to obtain the consent of their “Parents or Governours” before 
they could wed.85) But natural law thinkers like Locke and divines like William 
Fleetwood had long insisted that in cases of conflict, a father’s will was to pre-
vail over that of his wife.86 
Through the Delviles, Burney contests the unique authority that legislators, 
philosophers, and clerics accorded to fathers in the matter of marriage. Mr. Del-
vile effectively abdicates his authority because he is so stubborn and proud. 
After Mrs. Delvile becomes ill, her husband sends Cecilia a message informing 
her that either he or she must never see Mortimer again. Even the dutiful Ceci-
lia now feels that she is no longer obliged to abide by her guardian’s demands. 
“I return him . . . no answer, and I will make him no promise,” Cecilia tells the 
Doctor. “[T]o Mrs. Delvile alone I hold myself bound; to him, send what mes-
sages he may, I shall always hold myself free” (692). Mortimer likewise refuses 
to abide by his father’s wishes, appealing to his mother again in the hope that 
she will change her mind and grant him permission to marry Cecilia. Drained 
by the dispute and softened by her illness, Mrs. Delvile— who was herself 
“married . . . by her relations, without any consultation of her heart or her will” 
(461)— assents to the match on the condition that Cecilia take the Delvile name. 
Her husband, however, not only continues to withhold his consent but im-
pugns Cecilia’s character. The Delviles end up “so mutually irritated with each 
other, that they agre[e] to meet no more” (815). Although Mrs. Delvile writes to 
her husband “in terms of peace and kindness, lamenting their late dissention, 
and ardently expressing her desire to be reconciled to him before she [leaves] 
England” (817–18), Compton refuses either to reveal Cecilia’s defamer or to as-
sent to the match; his agreement with a gentleman— Cecilia’s false friend, Mr. 
Monckton, we later learn— trumps his tie to his wife. Mrs. Delvile has always 
maintained an “independent mind” and “judged for herself” (819), and she ex-
ercises that judgment now by giving her “separate consent” (819) for her son to 
wed Cecilia. Under the circumstances, the novel suggests, Mrs. Delvile’s assent 
provides an important check on her husband’s irrational behavior. 
Burney’s account of the secret vows that Cecilia exchanges with Mortimer, 
however, reaffirms the dangers of private matches, showing the practical im-
portance of paternal assent. Mortimer insists that they marry privately because 
a public union would “almost irritate [his father] to phrenzy [sic], by its daring 
defiance of his prohibition and authority” (822). After the ceremony, he plans 
“instantly [to] ride post to his father, and pay him, at least, the respect of being 
the first to communicate it” (824); thereafter, he plans to go abroad with his 
mother, whose failing health requires her immediate departure. As he does not 
wish to “make a run-away of [Cecilia] in the opinion of the world,” he plans to 
travel as a “single man” and to “leave the arrangement of every thing [concern-
ing their marriage] to his return” (824). When Cecilia objects to the “violent pre-
cipitancy” (824) of this proposal, Mortimer explains, “[a]ll I wish is the secret 
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certainty I cannot be robbed of you, that no cruel machinations may again work 
our separation, that you are mine, unalterably mine, beyond the power of ca-
price or ill fortune” (824). Ironically, Mortimer explains in one breath his inten-
tion to leave Cecilia, even as he declares, in the next, his desire to prevent any 
separation between them. His desire legally to “own” her ultimately trumps all 
practical concerns for her safety after the ceremony. Mortimer overcomes Ceci-
lia’s objections to his plan only when he beseeches her to honor her promise to 
be governed by Mrs. Delvile’s wishes. Consoled by the thought that, upon the 
terms specified, Mrs. Delvile “is content to wish [her] of [the] family” (825), Ce-
cilia agrees to submit to his mother’s decree. Again, however, she goes to Lon-
don secretly and finds herself consumed with regrets. And again her anxieties 
prove to be founded. As in the earlier episode, in this one, the speed with which 
Burney recounts the proceedings evokes Cecilia’s lack of agency and control. 
Although Mortimer attempts to inform his father of their union immediately 
after they solemnize it, Mr. Delvile senses that the matter concerns Cecilia and 
refuses to listen to what his son has to say. In his rage, he inadvertently reveals 
that Mr. Monckton is Cecilia’s slanderer, precipitating a duel in which Mor-
timer seriously injures Cecilia’s false friend. Mortimer promptly flees England 
in obedience to his wife’s wishes, but his haste causes Cecilia innumerable dif-
ficulties. No sooner does Mortimer leave her than her uncle’s conditional heir, 
Mr. Eggleston, asserts his title to her property, leaving Cecilia destitute and 
homeless. The economic and psychological troubles that she experiences after 
her marriage reinforce the dangers of the “clandestine scheme” (857). 
Cecilia’s decision to keep her difficulties a secret from her husband causes only 
more trouble. When Mortimer returns to England unexpectedly and finds her 
talking to Belfield in the latter’s chambers one night, he suspects her of infidel-
ity. (Even the “secret certainty” that they are married does not alleviate his fear of 
being “robbed” of her [824].) He sends her to his father’s house to await his own 
return but, not surprisingly, Mr. Delvile refuses to receive her there; the elder Del-
vile sends her back on a frantic search for her husband, precipitating her descent 
into madness. As Kristina Straub observes, Cecilia’s unconscious raving in the 
pawn-shop underscores her fear of and anger at her spouse, while the disorienting 
narrative leading up to her collapse evokes her lack of control.87 The advertise-
ment that the shop-owners place in the newspaper, inviting those to whom Cecilia 
“belongs to . . . send after her immediately” (901), confirms the depths to which 
she has fallen. Rather than enjoy her new status as wife, Cecilia becomes the object 
of yet another attempted exchange. Although Burney suggests that Mrs. Delvile’s 
consent to the match is theoretically sufficient, she shows the practical dangers of 
exchanging vows without securing Mr. Delvile’s approval.
Through Mr. Delvile’s eventual acceptance of Cecilia and Mortimer’s union, 
Burney proposes a new model of marriage as an affective tie, sealed by both 
maternal and paternal consent. Cecilia concludes that the lesson to take from 
the tragic turn of events is the “misery of DISOBEDIENCE” and the impor-
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tance of “filial ties and parental claims” (930). But, as Doctor Lyster observes, 
the difficulties are really “the result of PRIDE and PREJUDICE” (930). In bind-
ing himself to the perfidious Mr. Monckton and refusing to disclose what the 
latter tells him about Cecilia, Mr. Delvile allows secrecy and slander to inter-
fere with— and nearly destroy— his son’s marriage. When Doctor Lyster takes 
him to see Cecilia lying in the pawn-shop, “wholly insensible” (912), Mr. Del-
vile begins to regret the way that he has treated her. Upon viewing her pallid 
countenance and lifeless body, “[h]is pride, his pomp, his ancient name, . . . 
[sink] in his estimation” (912); he returns home, “stung by personal remorse, 
lamenting his own inflexibility” (913). Unfortunately, these feelings do not 
last long. He invites Mortimer and Cecilia to reside in St. James’s Square only 
after Mr. Monckton admits his treachery and impugns the Delvile name and, 
even then, he receives Cecilia begrudgingly. His cousin Lady Honoria mocks 
his continued investment in the “blood of [his] ancient and honourable house” 
(936), reminding us of the dilapidated condition of Delvile Castle and the moral 
degeneration of the family that has gone with it. Mrs. Delvile’s own reception 
of Cecilia sharply contrasts with that of her husband. As soon as Cecilia recov-
ers from her illness, she and Mortimer go abroad to visit his mother. Now, as 
before, Mrs. Delvile receives Cecilia with “the most rapturous fondness” (938), 
affirming her earlier consent to the match. Lady Honoria’s irreverent remarks 
and Mrs. Delvile’s warm welcome reaffirm the limits of the patriarchal prin-
ciple inscribed in Hardwicke’s Act. Where Burke maintained that the avarice of 
fathers would work in children’s favor, Burney shows the dangers of privileg-
ing rank and lineage over love, and familial pride over individual desire.88
Through Cecilia and Mortimer’s union, Burney also reimagines the relation-
ship between husbands and wives. Critics generally read the novel’s end as an 
endorsement of— or a capitulation to— patriarchal authority. In Castle’s words, 
“Cecilia is reborn . . . as the docile, impoverished female, stripped of power 
and plenitude, a sacrifice to the traditional script of female Bildung.”89 After 
Cecilia recovers from her illness, however, Mortimer shows signs of an impor-
tant change. Not only does he repent his earlier rashness and mistrust, but he 
finally renounces the Delvile pride. “[H]ow much higher must we all rise, or 
how much lower must you fall, ere any levelling principle will approximate us 
with YOU!” (937), he tells Cecilia, reversing his father’s moral calculus. Where 
Mrs. Delvile remains estranged from her husband, Cecilia now forms a strong 
bond with her spouse. Her position as a wife is further improved by the fortune 
that she inherits from Mortimer’s aunt. The narrator explains:
The sister of Mrs. Delvile, a woman of high spirit and strong passions, lived not 
long after [Mortimer’s uncle, Lord Delvile]; but having, in her latter days, inti-
mately connected herself with Cecilia, she was so much charmed with her charac-
ter, and so much dazzled by her admiration of the extraordinary sacrifice [Cecilia] 
had made, that, in a fit of sudden enthusiasm, she altered her will, to leave to 
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[Cecilia], and to her sole disposal, the fortune which, almost from his infancy, she 
had destined for her nephew. (939)
Unlike the Dean’s legacy, this gift comes without any conditions. Rather than 
consolidate authority and property in the male line, it relies upon develop-
ments in equity that empower women: Cecilia retains sole ownership of and 
control over the fortune; it goes directly to her rather than her husband.90 In 
a period marked by growing restrictions on married women’s property, the 
novel affirms the importance of female ownership, while contesting the traffic 
in women.91 Where the Dean sought to transfer his name and his property to 
Cecilia’s husband, Mortimer now makes possible the transmission of wealth 
from his aunt to his wife. Although Cecilia is reluctant to accept the legacy, 
Mortimer insists that she take it. He is “delighted to restore to [her] through his 
own family, any part of that power and independence of which her generous 
and pure regard for himself had deprived her” (939). Rather than claim own-
ership of his wife, Mortimer thus finally acknowledges her status as a propri-
etor in her own right. As a result of her inheritance, Cecilia is able to continue 
supporting the pensioners whom she aided before her union. Her marriage, of 
course, comes at a great cost; the novel repeatedly reminds us of the sacrifice 
that Cecilia makes in forfeiting her uncle’s estate. But the final bequest enables 
Cecilia to regain some of the independence that she enjoyed before becoming 
Mortimer’s wife. Even as the novel affirms— indeed, extends— the law’s re-
strictions on nuptial freedom, it imagines marriage as an affective agreement 
between two equal agents. 
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